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Abstract
Several theoretical and empirical developments in the literature on foreign
entry mode and performance, and on (international) strategy more generally,
were influenced or prefigured by Brouthers’ (2002) JIBS Decade Award winning
paper. Regarding theory, Brouthers is an archetype of the integration of trans-
action cost and institutional perspectives. I argue that it is also relevant to the
growing literature that aims at synthesizing these and other perspectives.
Methodologically, Brouthers (2002) contributed several uniquely direct and
rich measures. Furthermore, it not only displayed awareness of endogeneity
(specifically self-selection) issues, but also was among the pioneers in the com-
parative analysis of governance choices for a given firm or transaction. I elabo-
rate on the promising if challenging use of such “what if” imputation to identify
the impact of more or less well-aligned choices. Overall, I argue that such
methodological advances cannot be decoupled from the conceptual advances
that enable them, and which they reinforce.
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BROUTHERS’ (2002) CONTRIBUTIONS AND ONWARDS
This article takes as a starting point Brouthers (2002), the JIBS
Decade Award winner for 2012. As befits such an award winner,
Brouthers (2002) has had a remarkable impact. I trace this impact
to a series of contributions, and elaborate not just on this past
impact, but also on promising theoretical and methodological direc-
tions for research on mode of entry (MOE) choice and performance.1
In so doing, I aim to propose some research directions that hold
sufficient promise to keep MOE research vibrant, while avoiding the
pitfalls discussed by Shaver (2013).
Brouthers (2002) was a pioneering combination, as follows. It
was among the first separately, and the very first simultaneously,
to (a) examine the effects of mode of MOE choice on performance,
(b) using multiple explanatory perspectives, (c) for two different
dimensions of performance, and (d) taking into account endo-
geneity (specifically self-selection) of MOE decisions in a compara-
tively thorough manner. The general theme of this article will be
Journal of International Business Studies (2013) 44, 28–41
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that while some of these contributions have already
been rather widely acknowledged (especially the
ones first listed), several more latent contributions
deserve more attention, given promising research
areas in the field of international business (IB)
and related fields such as strategy. Thus Brouthers’
(2002) contributions create extra value as a set, and
in ways that could yet inform a new wave of MOE
research.
By the late 1990s, the study of the determinants
of MOE choice was well advanced, and codified
in many textbooks and articles. Yet, even in the
most thorough treatises, the matter of performance
tended to be handled as a matter of goal setting
and control more than as an object of study in itself
(e.g., Root, 1998). This may have been just as well,
for issues of endogeneity lurk deep in this research
area, such that plain predictions associating a given
MOE with inferior or superior performance are
likely to reflect conceptual misspecification, and
the results thereof are sensitive to unobserved
heterogeneity (Caves, 1998; Shaver, 1998). Brouthers
(2002) can be considered the first empirical paper in
the Journal of International Business Studies ( JIBS) to
display awareness of endogeneity and to make use of
this to develop further insights into a conditional
MOE–performance relationship. As such it is an
important milestone in the study of international
strategy.
Yet perusal of the forward citations to Brouthers’
paper shows that subsequent work has so far noti-
ced it mostly for other contributions. The forward
citations cluster around two themes. One involves
the combination of explanatory perspectives. In
this respect, the most commonly noted contribu-
tion is the inclusion of an institutional component
in Brouthers’ explanatory apparatus (e.g., Demir-
bag, Tatoglu, & Glaister, 2008). This is understand-
able, insofar as Brouthers’ paper was one of the first
quantitative applications of institutional theory in
JIBS, as well as one of the first to combine transac-
tion cost and institutional explanation to explain
performance. I will discuss the manner and contents
of this combination, and in so doing argue that
Brouthers (2002) is also inspiring for recent develop-
ments in theorizing about MOEs. The other cluster
of forward citations pertains to measurement – in
some cases specific items or variables (e.g., Cui &
Jiang, 2009), but especially the multidimensional
measurement of performance, including perceptual
items that are relatively scarce in MOE research
(Hult et al., 2008). I will argue that this aspect is all
the more important when considering the promise
of Brouthers’ (2002) last, if so far relatively under-
recognized contribution: acting on awareness of
the self-selection issues pertaining to the link
between MOE and performance, by first examining
the determinants of MOE choice and by offering
a template for “what if” analysis that remains an
underdeveloped yet critical area for progress in
MOE research.
Brouthers’ accompanying note (Brouthers, 2013)
provides further insight into the intent and con-
tributions of Brouthers (2002), and positions it
relative to Brouthers’ other work. Below, I will revi-
sit theoretical and methodological aspects of MOE
research (and in some cases of IB research more
generally), highlighting in places how Brouthers
(2002) exemplifies or otherwise informs best prac-
tice in such research.
LAYERS OF THEORY DEVELOPMENT
From Integration to Synthesis
As the above summary shows, one of Brouthers’
(2002) contributions lay in bringing together two
theoretical perspectives to explain MOE perfor-
mance: transaction cost economics and (neo) insti-
tutional theory.2 In the discussion that follows, I
read Brouthers’ (2002) third explanatory category,
“cultural context”, to belong conceptually within
broader institutional theory; I will return to indi-
vidual constructs and associated levels below.
Brouthers (2013) elaborates in some depth on the
fact that these theories were juxtaposed but not
made to moderate each other in Brouthers (2002),
and points to a possible pathway whereby institu-
tional effects are interacted with transaction cost
effects. As such, before turning to the contents of
these theories, it is relevant to position Brouthers
(2002) among types of theoretical contributions
that differ in the extent and manner in which they
accrete conceptual elements. This will also set the
ground for discussing associated empirical and
methodological considerations.
Naturally, in the process of conceptual accretion,
explanatory perspectives tend to be juxtaposed
before they are brought to bear on each other. Put
another way: integration – that is, bringing two or
more theories to bear independently on a given
phenomenon – precedes synthesis – that is, harnes-
sing one theory to identify the boundaries of
another, or even transforming both theories when
confronting them.3 Among papers building on two
or more theories in JIBS, integration accounted
for over two-thirds of research in the three years
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surrounding the publication of Brouthers (2002),
whereas in the three years that precede its repub-
lication alongside this paper, interactive contin-
gencies have grown in popularity to the point of
becoming a clear majority of multitheoretical
models. Bearing in mind Shaver’s (2013) admoni-
tion about “the R2 game”,4 synthesis is critical
insofar as it helps bound the use of specific theories,
and possibly eliminate ineffective ones.
In assessing Brouthers’ (2002) past and prospec-
tive impact, consider that several forms of con-
tingency modeling – and thus synthesis – may be
relevant to IB research. Here I will focus on what are
by far the two most common in our field (see Boyd,
Haynes, Hitt, Bergh, & Ketchen, 2012): interaction
and subgroup analysis. The single most common,
interaction analysis, allows one theory to channel
another, with the caveat that the identification of
which theory acts upon which is not inherently
clear from the statistics (although that problem is
alleviated in a related methodology, mediation).
Recent IB examples include Abdi and Aulakh (2012)
and Salomon and Wu (2012). Brouthers (2013)
identifies directions for interactions building on
the perspectives in Brouthers (2002). However, I see
at least as much to build upon in Brouthers (2002)
when considering the second most common appro-
ach to synthetic contingency theorizing: subgroup
analysis, which allows the existence and magnitude
of predictors to be compared across two or more
contexts. Subgroup analysis is particularly useful
for IB research insofar as geographic groupings
(such as nations and regions) and possibly organi-
zational groupings provide compelling subgroups.
Indeed, this forms the basis of the comparative
branch of the field of IB. Subgroup analysis remains
seldom used to its full extent in MOE research,
partly but not only for lack of data encompassing
theoretically driven subgroups.5
This matters because contingency approaches
differ in the inferences they allow: interaction
addresses the form of an effect, while subgroup
moderation addresses its strength or degree
(Arnold, 1982). For instance, Kotabe, Martin, and
Domoto’s (2003) split analysis of supplier relation-
ships in the United States and Japan also entails
comparisons of the relationships’ knowledge con-
tents and their association with time-bound rela-
tional assets, subtleties of which would be obscured
in interaction analyses but come out in subgroup
analysis. It also shows differences in control vari-
ables that further motivate splitting the sample
rather than using a necessarily limited number
of interaction terms. Subgroup analysis, possibly
combined with profile- or gestalt-based approaches
(Venkatraman, 1989), also represents a compelling
solution when it comes to incorporating the multi-
dimensional nature of contingency constructs such
as institutional forces.
From this standpoint, besides the potential for
interaction analyses discussed in Brouthers (2013),
Brouthers (2002) is equally noteworthy in that
its sample encompasses 27 host countries, as well as
12 home countries – a rare scope indeed for
an organization-level survey. Thus it supports the
potential for subgroup analyses too, indeed (and
quite exceptionally) on both host- and home-
country dimensions. As I will discuss further below,
this diversity of home and host countries raises
interesting questions about how to model unob-
served heterogeneity.
Combining Theoretical Perspectives
Of course, Brouthers’ (2002) impact is also associated
with the specific theories it built upon: transaction
cost economics and institution theory. Certainly,
transaction cost theory and related internalization
arguments form the mainstay of research on foreign
direct investment in general (Buckley & Casson,
2002; Caves, 2007), and its focus on transaction and
firm characteristics makes it a compelling explana-
tion for MOE choices (Dunning & Lundan, 2008;
Hennart, 1988). As such, it continues to form the
basis of most research on MOE, whether of the inte-
grative or synthesizing type (e.g., Bertrand, 2011;
Brouthers & Hennart, 2007; Maekelburger, Schwens,
& Kabst, 2012; Zhou & Poppo, 2010). Furthermore,
institutional theories have grown to substantial
prominence in MOE research. This is due in part to
the scope and (sometimes problematic) flexibility of
a perspective that, in its sociological branch (follow-
ing Scott, 1995), encompasses the isomorphic pull of
rivals and possibly other firm groupings; and, in both
its sociological and economic branches (the latter
following North, 1990), encompasses cultural, socie-
tal and government influences. Together, these per-
spectives offer a formidable set of MOE explanations
at multiple levels, which recent research continues to
draw upon (e.g., Abdi & Aulakh, 2012; Delmestri &
Wezel, 2011; Huang, Rode, & Schroeder, 2011).
Yet the theoretical scope of Brouthers (2002) alone
hardly suffices to explain its exceptional impact. It is
worth considering why. First, several contempora-
neous papers offered a similar integration, in some
cases proposing a more extensive coverage of Scott’s
(1995) institutional pillars (Guillén, 2003; Lu, 2002;
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Yiu & Makino, 2002). Indeed, as Brouthers (2013)
explains, the scope of institutional explanation was
intentionally kept at the higher (country rather than
country-industry or field) level in Brouthers (2002).
Second, compelling an explanation though institu-
tional theory may be, other MOE explanations also
imposed themselves during the same period, along-
side more established ones such as transaction cost
economics. In particular, organizational learning
and associated knowledge-based research (in the
tradition of Kogut & Zander, 1993) gained extra
attention ten years ago (Gaba, Pan, & Ungson, 2002;
Lu, 2002, Martin & Salomon, 2003a, b; Pedersen,
Petersen, & Sharma, 2003), and remains strongly
influential too (e.g., Hashai, 2011; Maekelburger
et al., 2012; Salomon & Wu, 2012). MOE research
has also been making steadily greater use of real
options arguments (e.g., Brouthers, Brouthers, &
Werner, 2008; Chi & Seth, 2008; Cuypers & Martin,
2010; Xu, Zhou, & Phan, 2010). Thus one needs to
go beyond the specific theoretical perspectives,
powerful though they may be, to fully appreciate
Brouthers’ (2002) contribution.
What was more distinctive about Brouthers (2002)
is that it examined determinants of the performance
of a specific entry (subsidiary), as well as determi-
nants of the choice of MOE. Among contempora-
neous studies using an institutional perspective, this
was an exceptional and challenging undertaking.
Institutional theory, especially in its sociological
branch, brings attention to firm behavior rather than
performance – indeed, performance may be deemed
altogether irrelevant (Meyer & Zucker, 1989). Mean-
while, from a transaction cost perspective, a plain
prediction associating a given entry mode with
inferior or superior performance is problematic. The
theory presumes that any mode is not inherently
inferior or superior, but that this depends on the
specificities of the investment, so that the best perfo-
mance will depend on the comparative fit of the
modes for the investment in question. In drawing
more consistently on the economic branch of insti-
tutional theory, and in tackling the equifinality
inherent in transaction cost economics, Brouthers
(2002) was exemplary in making the best of these
theoretical perspectives. Furthermore, this makes it
worth considering Brouthers’ (2002) contributions
from the standpoint of research design, insofar as
they addressed the tensions in associating MOE
performance with transaction cost theory and insti-
tutional theory alike. Accordingly, I will next dis
cuss some of that paper’s contributions to measure-
ment, and link those alongside theory to its further
contributions to the analysis of endogenous MOE
choice and performance.
DESIGNING RESEARCH TO PROBE THE LINK
BETWEEN MOE AND PERFORMANCE
Measurement
Among IB scholars, Brouthers and his co-authors
stand out for building a large and coherent research
program of MOE research based on original survey
data (see also Brouthers, 2013). For this same reason,
not all of the measures in Brouthers (2002) are
unique to that paper; nevertheless, several of them
are noteworthy when it comes to its prospective as
well as past impact.
Regarding transaction costs, Brouthers (2002)
developed a primary measure consisting of items
about the (perceived) costs of search and negotia-
tions, and the costs of making and enforcing con-
tracts, which comes remarkably close to the core
(Coasian) concept of transaction cost. Given both
the power of direct measures of such costs (Walker &
Poppo, 1991), and the importance of taking into
account their perceptual component (Williamson,
1975), this measure remains uniquely relevant for IB
researchers and beyond. Regarding institutional and
environmental effects, in addition to a measure of
legal restrictions on the choice of entry mode that
again stands out for its closeness to the construct of
interest (although it is made up of a single Likert-
scale item), Brouthers (2002) included a four-item
measure of various country-level risks.6
On the outcome side, besides a measure of MOEs
that serves as a de-facto first-stage dependent vari-
able, Brouthers (2002) conducted a factor analysis
to derive two measures of MOE performance: a
factor deemed “financial”, encompassing sales,
profitability and sales growth; and a “non-finan-
cial” factor encompassing market share, marketing,
reputation and market access. As I will discuss
below, such a distinction is relevant to the study of
“what if” scenarios regarding MOE and various
dimensions of performance.
Fit and Performance: The Science and Art of
‘‘What If’’
Consistent with IB as a business science, researchers
have been drawn to the question of whether the
scope of the multinational corporation, and the
means thereto (MOEs), are associated with perfor-
mance. However, making sound inferences about
the strategy–performance relationship is hindered
by an issue commonly referred to as endogeneity.
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Brouthers (2002: 204) was among the first to point
this out in JIBS, writing that MOE performance
studies “typically suffer from an endogeneity pro-
blem, i.e., mode performance is compared without
regard to the characteristics of the particular invest-
ment decision”. To be more precise, the most
distinctive issue for MOE research is one of self-
selection, whereby managers choose an MOE based
on characteristics that are expected to affect per-
formance (presumably to maximize said perfor-
mance), but which are (partly) unobservable to the
researcher. The underlying source of endogeneity
is thus omitted variables, rather than errors-in-
variables or simultaneous causality (Bascle, 2008) –
although these too may be of concern.7
Statistically, the issue is that if there are unob-
served antecedent variables that are associated with
both the choice of strategy and the performance
outcome, then an uncorrected estimator (such as
ordinary least squares) will be inconsistent, and the
observed estimate of the effect of strategy on per-
formance will be biased. Even using panel data may
not suffice to correct for this, in that fixed effects
are helpful only in controlling for unobserved
heterogeneity that is not time-varying.8 Reeb,
Sakakibara, and Mahmood (2012) provide a superb
overview of this and other endogeneity issues,
as well as potential methodological solutions
thereto – one extension of which I will expand
upon below.9 First, though, it is important to
consider that there is a key theoretical dimension
to this problem, and to the associated opportunity.
The challenge of linking strategy or governance
decisions to performance is not unique to IB
research, nor is the promise of “what if” analysis in
addressing it (Durand & Vaara, 2009). Theoretically,
the problem with the above (cross-sectional) infer-
ence is that it ignores the unique characteristics of a
firm or investment, such that the optimal decision
for one firm may be different from that of another
firm in the same sample. From a transaction cost
perspective, in particular, the issue is not that of
comparing firm i’s choice Ai with firm j’s choice Bj,
for a ceteris paribus condition cannot be presumed to
hold in such a comparison. Rather, the question is
how firm i would fare with choice Ai compared with
its own alternative choice Bi. That is, the counter-
factual is not how another firm would fare using a
different MOE, but rather how the same firm would.
As Masten (2002: 430–431) cogently put it:
The literature on firm performance cannot sustain general-
izations about the direction, much less the magnitude, of
the effects of organizational form on performance. A
problem y is that this research ends up answering the
question “How does the performance of firms that adopt
a particular governance arrangement compare to that of
firms that adopt alternatives to that arrangement?” when
the correct question, from a governance-choice perspective,
is “How does the performance of a firm that adopted a
particular arrangement compare with how that same firm
would have performed had it adopted an alternative?”
This same theoretical issue was identified for IB
research by Caves (1998). However, whereas most
treatments outside IB focus at least implicitly on
heterogeneity in firm characteristics, Caves pointed
to the extra complexity in assessing heterogeneous
environments – that is, the fact that the compar-
ison may be hindered not only because firms differ,
but because the specifics of the choices they
face also differ in complex ways across national
or regional environments. That is, heterogeneity
resides not just in firm characteristics, but also in
the choices they face:
Managers try to improve on random choices and make the
best decision contingent on the constraints and opportu-
nities facing the firm, and their efforts tend to trip up the
researcher who would “second-guess” the policy choice.
Policy A might be the best for a firm stuck with an inferior
set of opportunities; policy B may be a viable but not ideal
choice for a firm blessed with good opportunities. The
investigator who does not control for the firms’ different
opportunities concludes that policy B beats policy A,
whereas the short-changed firms are those that chose B
(Caves, 1998: 6–7).
The point, then, is – as Brouthers (2002: 204) put
it – one of “comparing the financial and non-
financial performance of mode choices that are
predicted by the extended transaction cost model
with the performance of other mode choices”. The
challenge therein is that we observe only one
choice by a given firm (in the sense of the MOE
for a given investment), and do not observe the
alternative. However, theory can help us specify
which choice makes most sense, based on the
available information. Returning to methods, two
subtly different approaches to this issue have been
used. Both involve two stages, with the first-stage
modeling MOE choice and the second stage
incorporating information from this first stage into
the performance model. I start by describing the
approach taken by Brouthers (2002), and then
compare it with that taken by Shaver (1998). I focus
on these two approaches, rather than alternatives
described by Reeb et al. (2012), because they spe-
cifically address cases where the first-stage choice is
polychotomous. This includes the dichotomous
Progress in entry mode choice and performance research Xavier Martin
32
Journal of International Business Studies
representations (binary choices) that are most
common in MOE research.
Brouthers (2002) modeled the MOE choice via a
logistic regression; used this first stage to obtain
predicted values (on a 0–1 scale) of either MOE
under consideration; and then incorporated into
the second-stage regression (presumably an OLS
model) a dummy indicating whether the observed
first-stage value fit the predicted MOE.10 The take-
away from this is, for each of the two performance
variables, an estimate of the effect of “entry mode
fit” (Brouthers, 2002: Table 3). By contrast, Shaver
(1998) employed a version of Heckman’s (1979)
method (see Lee, 1983, and Greene, 2011). This
uses a probit to model the first-stage choice, in this
case of (binary) MOE. A transformation of the first-
stage predicted probability (the inverse Mills ratio
or an extension thereof, typically labeled l and
referred to as the self-selection parameter) is then
included as a predictor in the second stage. It is also
possible to restrict the sample to either MOE while
still including the self-selection parameter in the
second stage, thus generating one set of coefficients
per choice (Shaver, 1998: Table 3). Finally, it is pos-
sible to evaluate the consequences of each choice
by multiplying the observed values of independent
variables by each into the sets of coefficients just
mentioned, and thus to compare the performance
of firms that chose mode A with the performance
that these same firms would have achieved had they
chosen mode B instead, and likewise to compare the
performance of firms that chose mode B with the
performance that these same firms would have
achieved had they chosen mode A instead. Figure 1(a)
provides a general representation of Shaver’s (1998:
Table 4) method in this respect, while Figure 1(b)
offers a variant of this approach based on first-stage
fit. The latter is akin in spirit to Brouthers’ use of his
first stage to measure entry-mode fit, and can also
be practiced with Heckman-based approaches (e.g.,
Masten, 1993).11
Comparing Brouthers’ (2002) approach with Heck-
man-based approaches such as Shaver’s (1998) is
interesting on empirical grounds, as well as on theore-
tical and methodological grounds. Remember that
the purpose of these approaches is initially methodo-
logical, that is, to avoid bias due to self-selection, but
that I argued that they also have relevance from a
theoretical standpoint, in addressing the “what if”
inherent in comparative governance theories such as
transaction cost economics.
In terms of their frequency of use to deal with
potential self-selection bias, there is a striking
difference. Brouthers and his co-authors remain
the only authors to have made use of a methodol-
ogy such as Brouthers’ (2002) in JIBS, and that
methodology is seldom used by other authors in
other IB journals either. By contrast, as of writing,
Heckman-based methods have been used in 35
JIBS papers dealing with a variety of topics, and
indeed their use increased markedly in the last
decade (e.g., Cui & Jiang, 2012; Gu & Lu, 2011;
Laamanen, Simula, & Torstila, 2012). When it comes
to controlling for self-selection, the Heckman-based
approach has one major advantage: the self-selection
parameter that gets carried into the second stage
serves to ensure a quasi-simultaneity in estimation
that strengthens the method’s ability to address
self-selection bias. To attain the same benefit, the
first stage in Brouthers’ approach would need to be
perfectly estimated, which rather contradicts the
shared assumption that some of the observed choices
are suboptimal (Caves, 1998; Masten, 2002; Shaver,
2013). Conversely, one constraint in using Heckman-



































Figure 1 Two representations of “what if” analysis: (a) compar-
ison of chosen vs alternative strategies (e.g., Shaver, 1998);
(b) comparison of fit vs misfit strategies (e.g., Masten, 1993).
Progress in entry mode choice and performance research Xavier Martin
33
Journal of International Business Studies
exclusion restriction (i.e., an instrument) that pre-
dicts the first stage but is not associated with the
second stage. Even then, a strong instrument is less
imperative when using the Heckman model than
when using alternative instrumental variable
approaches (Bascle, 2008); indeed the Heckman
model could be estimated absent an instrument,
based on the nonlinearity of the inverse Mills ratio,
although it is much preferable to have an exclusion
restriction. In terms of interpretation, even aside
from “what if” considerations, an advantage of
Heckman-based approaches is that second-stage
results can be compared with and without includ-
ing the self-selection parameter. From this stand-
point, compelling advances in MOE and other IB
research are found in papers that report different
results after controlling for self-selection (in parti-
cular Dastidar, 2008; Shaver, 1998).12
When it comes to the use of these methods
to obtain “what if” insights into the theoretical
challenges of associating MOE with performance,
the picture is rather different. Studies in related
fields have reported Heckman-based comparisons
of various governance choices: acquisition vs
greenfield entry (Shaver, 1998); equity joint ven-
ture vs non-equity alliance (Sampson, 2004);
and several instances of make or buy (Leiblein,
Reuer, & Dalsace, 2002; Masten, 1993; Mayer &
Nickerson, 2005). Of those, only Shaver (1998)
acknowledges an IB foundation, as does one paper
on a related topic, the effect of subsidiary mandate
on R&D intensity (Cantwell & Mudambi, 2005).
Noticeably, such Heckman-based work is absent
from the pages of JIBS. By contrast, Brouthers has
contributed consistently to this line of analysis,
including in JIBS (Brouthers, 2002; Brouthers,
Brouthers, & Werner, 1999). Brouthers’ work (and
that of his co-authors) thus stands out for
consistently addressing the counterfactual of the
same firm’s potential performance under an alter-
native strategy, albeit in the form of addressing
the consequences of a misfit in the MOE choice
(i.e., the version in Figure 1(b)).
It is also relevant to compare the ways in
which these approaches allow insight into the
MOE-performance relationship. Each of Brouthers’
(2002: Table 3) estimates can be understood as the
average effect of fit (or as he coded it misfit), and
thus a demonstration that an MOE choice that
fits generally outperforms one that does not. This
comparison, however, does not distinguish between
cases where the optimal choice is one entry mode vs
the other (in the case of Brouthers, 2002, wholly
owned vs shared ownership). Put more generally,
this analysis does not allow comparison between
one governance error (choosing mode A when the
firm should have chosen mode B) and its opposite
(choosing B when the firm should have chosen A).
By contrast, Heckman-based papers that have
explored the same-firm counterfactual have reported
different effects based on one choice vs the other
(Shaver, 1998, as in my Figure 1(a)) or between
one type of misfit and the other (e.g., Sampson,
2004, as in my Figure 1(b)); indeed, many have
shown substantive asymmetries in the costs of
(wrongly) choosing one MOE vs the other. This
approach thus provides extra precision in analysis,
and informs recommendations not only about the
pros and cons of each MOE when chosen optimally,
but also about the respective risks associated with
mistakenly choosing each alternative.
Although it is theoretically possible to check for
asymmetric performance effects of this kind by
extending Brouthers’ (2002) approach, there are
several other interpretation advantages with Heck-
man-based models. First, the interpretation of the
effect of fit is not only more robust if the first-stage
assumptions are met, but also more complete.
Consider now how the two coefficients in the
split analysis can be interpreted simultaneously. If
both coefficients indicate a superior outcome under
the focal choice than the alternative, that is,
AA’40 and BB’40 in Figure 1(a) (or equiva-
lently A*A*’40 and B*B*’40 in Figure 1(b),
albeit subject to the quality of the model used to
determine fit), then there is a situation of compara-
tive advantage. By contrast, if firms that chose one
strategy would have outperformed the other firms
regardless (i.e., both A and A* exceed both B and B*,
or vice versa), then there is absolute advantage
(Hamilton & Nickerson, 2003).13 These scenarios, in
turn, are associated with respectively weaker and
stronger asymmetries between one type of error
(choosing A over B) and the other.
Second, by including the self-selection parameter
in the separate second-stage Heckman-based regres-
sions based on choice, clues for further research
can be obtained. Shaver (1998) states that the sign of
the self-selection parameter is a function of the
correlation between unobservables (i.e., the correla-
tion between error terms) of the two stages. Thus a
positive (negative) coefficient indicates that un-
observables that affect the decision (the first-stage)
in one direction affect performance (the second
stage) in the same (opposite) direction. For instance,
the negative coefficient in column 5 of Shaver’s
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(1998) Table 3 implies that unobservables that
encourage acquisition are associated with lower
performance (survival). Indeed, there are plausible –
if hard-to-measure – potential explanations for this,
such as pertaining to information asymmetry or
perhaps hubris (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997; Sirower,
1997). On the other hand, absence of significance of
the self-selection parameter in the overall or split
second-stage regressions cannot be interpreted in
a simple way as proof that there is no self-selection,
let alone as proof that any endogeneity concern is
absent; alternative explanations include imperfec-
tions of the first stage, correlation of the self-
selection parameter with observed as well as unob-
served measures, and even the reduced sample sizes
inherent in split analyses.
Third, these distinctions help inform research
into transaction cost and other theories of com-
parative governance that hinge on the counter-
factual of a given firm’s potential performance
under one MOE vs another MOE. They allow us to
understand why in some cases (typically, absolute
advantage) one entry mode may seem to outper-
form the other before self-selection is controlled
for; yet some (weaker) firms would be better off
choosing the alternative. Likewise, this explains
why even when there is no apparent difference
before controlling for self-selection (as might in
particular happen with comparative advantage),
the choice of strategy may be thoroughly important
at the firm level. In both cases, substantive
differences may arise with either “what if” repre-
sentation (Figure 1(a) or Figure 1(b)). These distinc-
tions are also relevant to the stream of research in
IB that takes an evolutionary as well as an
institutional perspective (e.g., Cantwell, Dunning,
& Lundan, 2010 ; Kogut & Zander, 1993; Martin,
Swaminathan, & Mitchell, 1998; Nachum & Song,
2011). They help explain whether one might expect
a relatively rapid convergence (in the case of
absolute advantage) or conversely no convergence
(in the case of comparative advantage) towards one
MOE, and the rate at which one subpopulation of
firms may grow relative to another – depending on
firm characteristics as they match onto governance
options, but also on rates of mistakes in choosing
MOEs and on how strong selection pressures are.
Having discussed the opportunities for “what if”
analyses to contribute to the advancement of theory
in IB and related fields such as strategy, I now return
to two latent contributions of Brouthers (2002),
given these opportunities. The first has to do with
dependent variables. So far the literature has discussed
asymmetry in the effects of governance choices
and mistakes in terms of the magnitude of one
outcome variable. Yet, theoretically, there is no
reason to expect that the magnitude or even
direction of any asymmetry would be the same for
various dependent variables. Consider the choice
between wholly and jointly owned subsidiary, as in
Brouthers (2002), for instance. This decision has
bearing on the amount of control as well as
exposure to partner, on one hand (Chi & Roehl,
1997), but also on access to local partner resources,
often pertaining to local distribution (Hennart,
2009), on the other. Thus, depending on a foreign
investor’s capabilities and needs, a decision that
imparts complete ownership but forgoes local
partnership should be more harmful in terms of local
market access, whereas a joint venture may hamper
control and limit share of returns. To some extent,
these costs of MOE misalignment map onto
Brouthers’ (2002) “non-financial” and “financial”
performance constructs, respectively. These perfor-
mance distinctions can be refined and extended. I
would expect the timeframe for performance effects
to be longer when it comes to loss of controls or assets
than when it comes to lack of immediate market
presence. The level at which these effects manifest
themselves should vary, too: I would expect loss of
technological knowledge to eventually affect the
whole parent company (notwithstanding possible
countervailing arrangements such as suggested by
Zhao, 2006), while a failure to find a local marketing
partner should foremost affect the local subsidiary. I
return to the implications of this latter level issue
below. It remains that Brouthers’ (2002) distinction
between dimensions of performance, and his discus-
sion of efficiency and value enhancement motives,
should inform future research that theorizes asym-
metric consequences of MOE choice and (mis)fit (see
also Anderson & Dekker, 2005).
Another way in which Brouthers’ (2002) research
design remains exemplary for “what if” research
becomes apparent when we return to Caves’ (1998)
emphasis on local opportunities as a source of
potential heterogeneity. Indeed, when considering
the potential of two-stage procedures such as Heck-
man’s, Caves considered that “This design unfortu-
nately is hard to implement in research on IB, where
firms’ opportunity sets are hard to define and
characterize accurately and likely to be highly
heterogeneous” (1998: 7). To the extent that this
challenge arises, it also represents an opportunity for
IB researchers, who may use institutional and other
constructs to advance the understanding of such
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opportunity sets. Not least, such an endeavor will
benefit from research designs that are rich enough to
allow cross-country comparisons and in particular
subgroup analyses – such as Brouthers’ (2002).
Having addressed how IB scholars can draw upon
research such as Brouthers’ to design studies that
not only address endogeneity, but also make both
theoretical and empirical contributions to the com-
parative study of MOEs, I will next briefly address
three further boundaries where theory should
either promote or benefit from advances in research
design.
THREE FURTHER RESEARCH BOUNDARIES
Returning first to the combining of theory, a start-
ing point is that a single theory study tends to be
incomplete in dealing with alternative explana-
tions – something that is especially critical by dint
of the multifaceted context and decision set for
MOE and other IB research (Martin, Swaminathan,
& Tihanyi, 2007). Yet bringing multiple theories to
bear also entails extra attention to the level at
which each theory operates. Consider the combi-
nation found in Brouthers (2002), among others:
transaction cost economics operates at the firm or
ideally even the eponymous transaction level (see
Hennart, 1991), whereas institutional theory oper-
ates at the country level (and, in some versions, at
the industry or organizational field level). Studies
that use explanatory variables at multiple levels
should be informed by multilevel methodology
(such as hierarchical linear modeling); this is espe-
cially so of studies that include theory synthesis as
I discussed above, and thus generate cross-level
effects (Arregle, Hébert, & Beamish, 2006; Peter-
son, Arregle, & Martin, 2012). However, only some
versions of instrumental variables methodology
have been worked out with multilevel applications
so far (see Abdi & Aulakh, 2012); implementa-
tions with a binary first step and specifically in
a Heckman framework remain econometrically
unproven (Rabe-Hesketh, Skrondal, & Pickles,
2002). Advances in this area would enable stronger
integration of theory and methods in MOE and
other IB and strategy research.
Second, as discussed above, taking care of endo-
geneity is not just a methodological issue, but also
one of theoretical attention and specification. In
particular, apparent effects may turn out to be
spurious and shown to be no longer significant
after correcting for self-selection (e.g., Leiblein
et al., 2002; Shaver, 1998). As such, this approach
can also be a means of pruning theory by identifying
predictions that do not hold, or hold only spuriously
(Leavitt, Mitchell, & Peterson, 2010). However,
finding an effect to be non-significant does not
allow the conclusion that the absence of an effect
has been “proven”. A set of dedicated steps and
methods is required to demonstrate that an effect is
indeed non-existent (or sufficiently trivial) with a
level of confidence that matches that used in
conventional testing away from the null hypothesis.
Cuypers and Martin (2010) demonstrate such a
methodology in IB research; but again, integration
with a Heckman analysis remains incomplete.
Third, so far in this paper the concept of MOE has
been defined broadly. Various studies encompass
wholly owned vs joint venture (Brouthers, 2002)
and acquisition vs greenfield subsidiary (Shaver,
1998), but also licensing and exporting (e.g.,
Martin & Salomon, 2003a), equity joint venture
vs non-equity alliance (Sampson, 2004), etc. MOE
researchers commonly reduce the range of MOEs to
a binary choice in the interest of modeling that
choice, whether by pooling some choices (joint
ventures, licenses and other types of contract vs
wholly owned subsidiaries in Kogut & Zander,
1993) or by eliminating some observations (licen-
sing and exporting in Brouthers, 2002). This leaves
the theory and interpretation contingent on the
heterogeneous aggregation or exclusion of some
MOEs. Furthermore, some MOEs are not mutually
exclusive; in particular, a wholly owned subsidiary
may be either an acquisition or a greenfield
entry (Slangen & Hennart, 2008), as might a joint
venture for that matter. Brouthers and Hennart
(2007), among others, labeled the acquisition–
greenfield distinction one of “mode of establish-
ment”; but that terminology is far from commonly
accepted (e.g., Harzing, 2002; Lee & Lieberman,
2010), and even research that incorporates the
distinction has reduced the empirical analysis
to binary dependent variables (Dikova & van
Witteloostuijn, 2007; Slangen & Hennart, 2008).
However, this limitation may be relaxed by
using a multinomial model of MOEs (e.g., Chang
& Rosenzweig, 2001),14 which in turn is also
increasingly compatible with the “what if” discus-
sion above. Although a binary specification is
convenient when modeling the first stage of a
Heckman-based estimation, several multinomial
extensions of the Heckman first stage have been
proposed. Among those, Lee’s (1983) is much the
most commonly used in business research, yet
evidence has accumulated that alternatives are
more robust (Bourguignon, Fournier, & Gurgand,
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2007; Schmertmann, 1994). The assumption of
independence of irrelevant alternatives remains a
major hurdle to potential uses of multinomial logit
choice models in MOE research, since it is to be
presumed that decision-makers parse through alter-
natives carefully. Nevertheless, this represents one
area where progress is being made that will also
allow generalized Heckman-based estimations
encompassing a broader range of MOEs than
hitherto studied.
At this juncture, though, the burden returns to
theory, as the researcher should first specify in what
way the inclusion of extra MOEs in the analysis
changes the base comparison and otherwise sheds
insight, such as on the cross-sectional or long-
itudinal interdependence among MOE choices
(Shaver, 2013). Given the prominence of debates
such as whether alliances should be considered as
an intermediate mode between hierarchy (wholly
owned subsidiary) and market (contract or licen-
sing) or conversely be considered as a perpendicular
alternative operating under different governance
conditions (Hennart, 1993; Powell, 1987; William-
son, 1991), I believe that compelling opportunities
still exist for MOE research, and that such progress
stands to inform IB and strategy research more
generally.
CONCLUSION
I have argued that Brouthers’ (2002) contributions
can be seen as multifaceted: furthering the analysis
of the effects of mode of MOE choice on perfor-
mance (and of their joint antecedents); contribut-
ing to the rise of institutional theory in IB research;
proposing several measurement advances, includ-
ing regarding dimensions of performance; and
bringing attention to the self-selection of MOEs
and the associated research opportunities. If some
of my commentary has emphasized methodologi-
cal progress and prospects, it is because methods
serve as a bridge between theory and empirics, and
link them in the cyclical process of scientific
development (Runkel & McGrath, 1972). Thus I
argued that some of Brouthers’ (2002) theoretical
arguments opened up methodological and empiri-
cal avenues, and likewise some of his research
design choices can inspire fresh theorizing and
empirics about MOEs, and indeed about interna-
tional strategy more generally (see also Kalnins,
2007). This set of contributions marks Brouthers
(2002) as a worthy JIBS Decade Awardee well
beyond 2012 – congratulations, Keith! – and also
demonstrates how entry mode research can remain
a potent area for the advancement of scholarship in
IB and strategy.
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NOTES
1By modes of entry, I mean all possible means of
expanding into a foreign market. The studies discussed
here typically focus on a binary choice such as wholly
owned vs jointly owned (Brouthers, 2002) or acquisition
vs greenfield entry (Shaver, 1998). MOEs also include
licensing and exporting (e.g., Martin & Salomon,
2003a). In the penultimate section of this paper, I return
to the challenges that arise when considering the diver-
sity and potential combinations of MOEs.
2I refer by “theoretical perspective”, or “theory” in
short, to a coherent set of concepts and assumptions
that has achieved sufficient paradigmatic recognition
to have both theoretical weight and meaning as a
commonly understood perspective. While this pro-
vides convenient shorthand in academic debate, it
remains that the development of specific refutable
hypotheses from such a theory requires researchers
to explicate causal linkages specific to their topic
(Thomas, Cuervo-Cazurra, & Brannen, 2011).
3It is of course possible, and not uncommon, to
combine types and forms of theorizing. Thus Lu
(2002) integrates transaction cost and institutional
arguments, and adds an experiential contingency
on institutional effects. As another example, Martin
and Salomon (2002, 2003b) create a functional
synthesis of internalization and knowledge-based
arguments depending on tacitness, and then develop
a further contingency analysis based on firm capabil-
ities, presented via subgroup representation (see
below).
4Also, JIBS editors have duly advised on the need for
rigor in combining theory (Bello & Kostova, 2012;
Cheng, Henisz, Roth, & Swaminathan, 2009).
5It is of course common and often proper to conduct
an interaction analysis, and then ascertain the robust-
ness and perhaps the directionality of the results though
subgroup analysis. Here, I focus on maximizing the
insights from either approach and in particular from
subgroup analysis. This does not preclude cumulating
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the two approaches, but entails that each method be
used to its full potential. Furthermore, subgroup analysis
is compelling for certain nonlinear estimators, where the
interpretation of interaction terms is fraught (e.g.,
Penner-Hahn & Shaver, 2005).
6The latter measure is not exclusively an institutional
variable, as Brouthers (2002) recognized in classifying
his independent variables. However, elements of
(perceived) risk from cultural, political, social and
economic conditions are now acknowledged to be
intrinsic components of the institutional environment
(Martin, Salomon, & Wu, 2010).
7As Bascle (2008) points out, if the source of endog-
eneity is errors-in-variables or simultaneous causation,
then the researcher should consider instrumental
variable methods other than the Heckman approach
and its derivatives, on which I focus below.
8Reeb et al. (2012) point to a related concern with
fixed effects: if unobserved heterogeneity is associated
with time-invariant or slow-changing phenomena of
interest, then the fixed effects absorb the relevant
variance and thus impede studying it. I would add that
this might be avoided where the variance in question
is at a level that can be used for subgroup analysis (see
also Peterson et al., 2012).
9Reeb et al. (2012) do not specifically discuss the
Heckman method, but as described below it can be
considered a form of instrumental variable approach
(see also Bascle, 2008).
10In a related approach, Aulakh and Kotabe’s (1997)
study of international channel integration employed a
first-stage logit (of the multinomial and ordered kind,
which I return to below) and made insightful use of a
MANOVA to show both the irrelevance of choices as
such, and the relevance of predicted fit.
11The representation in Figure 1(b) would require a
different split than Shaver’s (1998), based on inferred
optimal choices rather than observed choices. As such
its interpretation is less straightforward, and subject to
the ambiguities of finding a proper cutoff. Sampson
(2004: Table 8) illustrates this approach. I present
Figure 1(b) here to facilitate the comparison with
Brouthers and the theoretical discussion to follow.
12For this reason, space considerations allowing, it is
desirable to report on the impact of adding the self-
selection parameter in greater detail. Some applica-
tions of the Heckman correction may appear to add
little value – for instance, Krishnan, Martin, and
Noorderhaven (2006) had to report a first-stage and
Heckman correction for an MOE variable that was but
a control variable, and an insignificant one at that, in
the performance model of interest. However, for the
most part JIBS authors and reviewers are prone to err in
the opposite direction, with many papers providing
few or even no details about how the endogeneity
correction was implemented.
13The apparent overall effect in terms of (mis)fit, as
in Figure 1(b), would depend on the proportions of
firms making each type of mistake. The preceding
quote by Caves (1998) corresponds to a case of
absolute advantage, assuming that firms with weak
opportunities and firms with strong opportunities
would both be better off with “policy A”.
14An ordered probit (or logit) could apply
where choices so fit. So might a nested logit. Where
predictors are characteristics of the choice rather than
(or in addition) of the chooser, a conditional model
is relevant, although the conditional probit is less
well developed computationally than the conditional
logit.
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